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Abstract
The compromise value is introduced for cooperative games with random payoffs, that is,
for cooperative games where the payoff to a coalition of players is a random variable. It is a
compromise between utopia payoffs and minimal rights. This solution concept is based on the
compromise value for NTU games and the -value for TU games. It is shown that the nonempty
core ofa game is boundedbythe utopiapayoffs andthe minimalrights. Further, we show thatthe
compromise value of a cooperative game with random payoffs is determined by the -value of a
related TU game if the players have special types of preferences. Finally, the compromise value
and the marginal value, which is deﬁned as the average of the marginal vectors, coincide on the
class of one- and two-persongames.
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1 Introduction
Inthispaperweintroduceandstudythecompromisevalueforcooperativegameswithrandompayoffs
which are introducedin Timmer, Borm and Tijs (2000a). In these games, the payoffs that the players
can obtain by cooperation are not known with certainty and are modeled as random variables. The
playerscannotawaittherealizationsofthepayoffsbeforedecidinguponanallocationofthesepayoffs.
Hence, the preferences of the players over the uncertain payoffsplay an important role in the analysis
of such games. Further, the possibleallocations of the payoffs are of a speciﬁc type.
Anothermodeltoanalyzethiskindofsituationsisthatofstochasticcooperativegamesintroduced
by Suijs, Borm, De Waegenaere and Tijs (1999) and further developed by Suijs (2000). The main
differences with cooperative games with random payoffs lie in the assumptions on the preferences
and the structure of the set of allocationsof the payoffs (see Timmer et al. (2000a) for more details).
1I thank Peter Borm and Ruud Hendrickx for their valuable comments.
2Center for Economic Research and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, P.O.
Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands. E-mail address: j.b.timmer@kub.nl. This author acknowledges ﬁnancial
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1The compromise value for cooperative games with random payoffs is based on the compromise
value for NTU games. In its turn, this latter value is an extension of the -value for TU games.
The -value is a solution concept for quasi-balanced TU games introduced by Tijs (1981). It is a
compromisebetween theutopiapayoffsandthe minimalrightsof theplayers. Thecompromise value
value for compromise admissible NTU games, introduced by Borm, Keiding, McLean, Oortwijn and
Tijs (1992), is deﬁned in a similar way. These utopia payoffs and minimal rights have several nice
properties. First, if the core of the game is nonempty then the utopia payoffs and the minimal rights
provide upper and lower bounds of the core. This implies that a TU or NTU game with a nonempty
core is quasi-balanced or compromise admissible, respectively. Finally, if all marginal vectors of a
TU game belong to the core then the minimal right of any player equals his individual payoff. For
a survey on compromise values in cooperative game theory the reader is referred to Tijs and Otten
(1993).
The compromise value for cooperative games with random payoffs is a compromise between the
utopia payoffs and the minimal rights, whose deﬁnitions are based on their counterparts for NTU
games. The properties of the utopia payoffs and minimal rights are similar to those for TU and NTU
games. For all cooperative games with random payoffs with a nonempty core and with a nonzero
payoffforthecoalitionofallplayers,thecoreisboundedbytheutopiapayoffsandtheminimalrights.
Consequently,suchgamesarecompromiseadmissible. Ifallmarginalvectorsbelongtothecoreofthe
game then any player is indifferent between receiving his minimal right and receiving his individual
payoff. Furthermore, if all players have a special type of preference relation then the compromise
value is determined by the -value of a related TU game. Finally, we relate the compromise value to
the marginal value, which is deﬁned as the average of the marginal vectors. These values coincide on
the class of one- and two-person games. Timmer, Borm and Tijs (2000b) characterized the marginal
value on this class of games. Consequently, there exists a characterization of the compromise value
on this class of games.
The organizationof thispaper isas follows. In section2 a brief introductiontocooperativegames
with random payoffs is given. The compromise value for these games is introduced in section 3.
We show that the core is bounded by the utopia payoffs and the minimal rights. In section 4 several
properties of the compromise value are presented. After this, it is shown that the compromise value
is determined by the -value of a related TU game if all the players have a speciﬁc type of preference
relation. Section4isconcludedbyshowingthecoincidenceofthecompromisevalueandthemarginal
value on the class of one- and two-person games.
2 Cooperative games with random payoffs
In this section we recall some basic concepts of cooperative games with random payoffs as intro-
duced in Timmer, Borm and Tijs (2000a). A cooperative game with random payoffs G is a tuple
(N;(R(S))S2S;A;(i)i2N). N istheﬁniteplayer set. A nonemptysubsetofN iscalleda coalition.
Thenonnegativerandom payoff tocoalitionS is denotedbyR(S). S isthe set of allcoalitionswitha
2nonzero payoff. The set A contains all the possibleindividualpayoffs that a player may receive. The
functioni describes how player i 2 N compares any two individual payoffs.
In more detail, let N = f1;:::;ng.T h e s e t L +is the set of all nonnegative random variables
with ﬁnite expectation. 0 stands for the payoff zero for sure. Note that 0 2L +. The random payoff
to coalitionS, R(S),i sa s s u m e dt ob ea ne l e m e n to fL +.S=f SNj S6 =; ;R ( S )6 =0 gis the set
of all coalitions with a payoff unequal to zero. Hence, for coalitionS it holds that S= 2Sif and only
if R(S)=0 .
An allocationof the random payoff R(S)is a vector pR(S),p 2 IR S , of multiplesof R(S).S u c h
an allocation is efﬁcient if p 2 (S)=f p2IR S j
P
i 2 S p i =1 g .Ais the set of all the possible
individualpayoffswithregard totherandom payoffsR(S)tothecoalitions,A = ftR(S)jt 2 IR ;S2
Sg. A−0 =ftR(S) 2A j t6 =0 gis the restriction of A to all the nonzero individualpayoffs.
The preference relation
%i of player i 2 N has the following interpretation. Let X;Y 2Abe
two individualpayoffs. Player i weakly prefers X to Y if X
%i Y . She is indifferent between them,
X i Y ,i fX
%iY and Y
%i X. Finally, she strictly prefers X to Y , X i Y ,i fX
%iY and not
Y
%i X. We assume the followingabout this preference relation.
Assumption 2.1 For all players i 2 N there exist surjective, strictly increasing and continuous
functionsfi




T(t0)R(T) if and only if t  t0
and fi
S(0) = 0 for all S;T 2Sand t;t0 2 IR .
So, if player i compares the payoffs pR(S) and qR(T), S;T 2S ,t h e npR(S)
%i qR(T) if and
onlyif t =( f i
S) − 1( p )t 0=( f i
T) − 1( q ) . Hence, the function(fi
S)−1, S 2S , may be interpretedas a
kind of utilityfunctionwith respect to multiplesof R(S) only. Two examples of preference relations
%i that satisfy this assumption are the following. Let X;Y 2A . The ﬁrst example is X
%i Y if and
only if E(X)  E(Y ) with E(X) the expectation of the random variable X. We refer to this type of
preferences as ‘expectation preferences’. Deﬁne fi
S(t)=t=E(R(S)) for all S 2S . This function
satisﬁes assumption2.1.
For the second example let uX
i =s u p f t2IR j PrfX  tg igbe the i-quantileof the random
variable X where 0 < i<1is such that u
R(S)
i > 0 for all S 2S . Deﬁne the (utility) function
Ui : A!IR by Ui(X)=u X
 i if X  0 and Ui(X)=u X
1 −  i otherwise. The preference relation
X




i describe these preferences. Notice that both expectation preferences and quantile
preferences have linear functions fi.T h a ti s ,f i
S( t )=tfi
S(1) for all t 2 IR .
In this paper we often like to know for which real number i it holds that X i iY where
X 2Aand Y 2A − 0 . For this reason we deﬁne i(X;Y) to denote this number i. It follows
from assumption 2.1 that the number i(X;Y) is unique and if X = pR(S) and Y = qR(T) then
i(X;Y)=f i
T((fi
S)−1(p))=q. If we interpret (fi
S)−1, S 2S , as some kind of utility function
then i(X;Y) is that multiple of Y that gives player i the same utility as X, namely (fi
S)−1(p).
3Further, deﬁne i(0;0) = 1. Again from assumption 2.1 it can be deduced that if S 2Sthen
piR(S) i 0 if pi > 0 and 0 i piR(S) if pi < 0. Hence, there exists no real number i such that
piR(S) i i  0=0 ,p i6 =0 . This is why i(X;0) is not deﬁned for any X 2A − 0.
The lemma below, lemma 2.3 in Timmer, Borm and Tijs (2000b), presents some properties of the
preference relations
%i and the functions i that we use in this paper.
Lemma 2.2 For any i 2 N, h 2 IR and X 2A − 0it holds that i(hX;X)=h .
If the functionsfi
S are linear for all S 2Sthen
 i(pR(S);qR(T))= pfi
T(1)=(qfi
S(1)) for any pR(S) 2Aand qR(T) 2A − 0,
 pR(S)
%i qR(T)if and only if p=fi
S(1)  q=fi
T(1) for any pR(S);qR(T)2A .
Let GN be the set of all cooperative games with random payoffs and player set N that satisfy
assumption 2.1. Let G 2G N. The imputation set I(G) contains all the allocations of R(N) that are
efﬁcient and individualrational:
I(G)=f pR(N)jp 2 (N);p i R ( N )
%iR ( f i g )for all i 2 Ng :






p 2 IR S ; 9 q 2   ( S ): q iR ( S) ip iR ( N)for all i 2 S
o
:
The core C(G) of the game contains those efﬁcient allocations of R(N) that are not dominated by
any coalition:
C(G)=f pR(N)jp 2 (N);p S R ( N )= 2dom(S) for all coalitionsSg
with pS =( p i) i 2 Sthe restriction of p to coalition S. Notice that C(G)  I(G).
Let (N) be the set of all bijections  : f1;:::;ng!N .L e t 2 (N). Coalition S
i =
f(k)jk  ig consists of the ﬁrst i players according to  2 (N). The marginal contributionY 
(1)
of the ﬁrst player (1) is equal to his individualpayoff, Y 
(1) = R(f(1)g)=R ( S 
1) .T h em a r g i n a l














Each player j 2 S
i−1 receives from player (i) therandom payoffj(Y 
j ;R(S
i))R(S
i ).P l a y e rjis
indifferent between receiving this payoff and receiving her marginal contribution Y 
j .T h em a r g i n a l
contribution of player (i) is all that remains of the payoff R(S
i ). The marginal vector M(G)
corresponding to permutation  2 (N) is deﬁned by M
i (G)=m 
i( G ) R ( N)for all i 2 N, with
m
i (G)= i ( Y 
i;R(N)). To ensure that the marginal vectors are well deﬁned, that is, to avoid
i(X;0)for some X 2A − 0, we assume the followingaboutthe payoff structureof the game G only
if we talk about marginal vectors.
4Assumption 2.3 If R(T)=0for some coalition T then R(S)=0for all coalitions S such that
S  T.
Let HN G Nbe a setof cooperativegames withrandom payoffsandplayer setN. A solutionΨ
forcooperativegameswithrandompayoffsisafunctiononHN suchthatΨ(G)isanallocationpR(N)
for the game G 2H N. The marginal value m for a game G 2G Nthat satisﬁes assumption 2.3 is










This solution concept for cooperative games with random payoffs is introduced in Timmer et al.
(2000a) and studied in Timmer et al. (2000b).
3 The compromise value
Thecompromise valuefor cooperativegames withrandom payoffsisan extensionof the compromise
value for NTU games, which in its turn is an extension of the -value for TU games. The latter
two values are introduced and studied in Borm, Keiding, McLean, Oortwijn and Tijs (1992) and Tijs
(1981), respectively. These values are a compromise between utopia payoffs and minimal rights.
Let G =( N;(R(S))S2S;A;(i)i2N) be a cooperative game withrandom payoffsand let i 2 N.
Suppose player i proposes the efﬁcient allocation pR(N). It seems reasonable to assume that the













9 a 2 IR N nfig :
P
j2Nnfigaj + t =1 ;





The payoff Ki(G)R(N)is called the utopia payoff to player i. Attention will be paid only to games
G with Ki(G) 2 IR .
If player i is a member of coalition S then any player j 2 S nf i gwill not object against an
efﬁcient allocation of R(S) in which she is better off than receiving her utopia payoff. Hence, the











9 a 2 IR S nfig :
P
j2Snfigaj +t =1 ;




The remainder of i in S, (S;i), is deﬁned as the remainder r(S;i)R(S) expressed as a multiple of
R(N):
(S;i)= i( r ( S;i)R(S);R(N)):




5We restrict ourselves to games G with ki(G) 2 IR for all players i. The lemma below showsthat this
conditionis satisﬁed for all games with R(N) 6=0 .
Lemma 3.1 For any G 2G Nwith R(N) 6=0 ,K i( G )<1and ki(G) 2 IR for all i 2 N.
Proof. Let G 2G Nbe a cooperative game with random payoffs and R(N) 6=0 .F i r s t ,










9 a 2 IR N nfig :
P
j2Nnfigaj +t =1 ;















9 a 2 IR N nfig :
P
j2Nnfigaj +t =1 ;
a jR ( N)





where the last inequality followsfrom R(N) 6=0 .
Second, let S be a coalition of players. If R(S) 6=0then r(S;i) 2 IR and consequently
(S;i) 2 IR .I f R ( S )=0then r(S;i)=−1 and (S;i)= i ( −1  0;R(N)) = 0 since
R(N) 6=0 . We conclude that ki(G) = maxS:i2S (S;i) 2 IR .
2
Ag a m eGis called compromiseadmissibleif Ki(G);k i(G)2IR for all i 2 N,
ki(G)  Ki(G) for all i 2 N; and
X
i2N




Hence, in a compromise admissible game the utopia payoff of a player is larger than his minimal
right and there exists an efﬁcient allocation of R(N) between the allocation of utopia payoffs and
the allocation of minimal rights. Denote by CN the set of all compromise admissible games G with
player set N.
The compromisevalue c onCN istheuniqueefﬁcient allocationbetween the minimalrightsand
the utopia payoffs,
c(G)=( k ( G )+γ(K(G )−k(G )))R(N);
where 0  γ  1 is the unique real number such that k(G)+γ(K(G )−k(G )) 2 (N).
Example 3.2 Consider the game G =( N;(R(S))S2S;A;(i)i2N) where N = f1;2;3g.T h e
payoffs to the various coalitions are R(f1g)=0 ,R ( f 2 g )=1 ,R ( f 3 g )=0 ,R ( f 1 ; 2 g )=4 ,
R ( f 1 ; 3 g )=1 ,R ( f 2 ;3 g )=3 ,a n dR ( N)U(4;8),t h a ti s ,R ( N)is uniformly distributedover the
interval [4,8]. Hence S = ff2g;f1;2g;f1;3g;f2;3g;Ngand A = fpR(S)jp 2 IR ;S2S g .
Let1 =1 = 2and2 = 3 =1 = 4 . Recallfromsection2thatuX
i =s u p f t2IR j PrfX  tg ig




i for all S 2S ,t2IR . From this we obtain the maps i.N o w









9 a 2 IR f 2 ; 3 g : a 2 + a 3 + t =1 ;





=s u p f t 2 IR j9a 2 IR f 2 ; 3 g : t =1−a 2−a 3;a 2+a 33 = 5; a2  1=5; a3  0g
=2 = 5
6and similarly, K2(G)=5 = 6and K3(G)=3 = 10. For player 2 we have r(f2g;2) = 1,
r(f1;2g;2) = supft 2 IR j9a 2 IR : a + t =1 ;aR(f1;2g) 1 2R(N)=5g
=s u p f t 2 IR j9a 2 IR : t =1−a ;a>3 = 5 g
=2 = 5 ;
r ( f 2 ; 3 g ; 2)= 1=2,a n dr ( N;2) = 3=10. The remainders for player 2 are
(f2g;2) = 2(r(f2g;2)R(f2g);R(N))= 1=5;
(f1;2g;2) = 8=25, (f2;3g;2) = 3=10 and (N;2) = 3=10. Thus, the minimal right for player 2
is k2(G)R(N)where
k2(G) = maxf1=5;8=25;3=10;3=10g =8 = 25:
In a similar way we obtain k1(G)=0and k3(G)=0 . The game G is compromise admissible and
c(G) = (102=455;79=130;153=910)R(N)
is the compromise value.
3
Itisknownfor TUandNTUgamesthattheminimalrightsandutopiapayoffsare lowerandupper
bounds,respectively, for the nonemptycore of the game (cf. Tijs and Lipperts (1982)and Borm et al.
(1992)). This result extends to cooperative games with random payoffs.
Theorem 3.3 For all G 2G Nwith R(N) 6=0and C(G) 6= ; and for any pR(N) 2 C(G),
ki(G)  pi  Ki(G) for all playersi.
Proof. Let G 2G Nb eag a m ew i t hR ( N)6 =0and C(G) 6= ;.L e tpR(N) 2 C(G) and let i 2 N.
By deﬁnition of the utopia payoff and by ajR(N)












9 a 2 IR N nfig :( a;t) 2 (N);




=s u p f t 2 IR j9a 2 IR N nfig :( a;t)R(N) 2 C(G)g
 pi;
where (a;t) is shorthand for the vector (a1;:::;a i−1;t;a i+1;:::;a n)in IR N .
Next, let coalition T, i 2 T, be such that ki(G)= ( T;i).I fT=f i gthen ki(G)= ( f i g ;i)=
 i( R ( f i g ) ;R(N)) where the second equality follows from the deﬁnition of (fig;i). Because
pR(N) 2 C(G)  I(G) we have piR(N)
%i R(fig) i ki(G)R(N). According to assumption 2.1
this implies pi  ki(G).
Otherwise, T nf i g6 =; . Suppose that ki(G) >p i . Then there exists an "i > 0 such that
ki(G) >p i+" i. According to assumption 2.1 (pi + "i)R(N) i ki(G)R(N) i r(T;i)R(T)and
there exists an "0
i > 0 such that
(pi + "i)R(N) i (r(T;i)−"0
i)R(T):
7By deﬁnition of r(T;i)there exists a vector ^ a 2 IR T nfig satisfying
P
j2Tnfig^ aj + r(T;i)−"0
i =1
and ^ ajR(T) j Kj(G)R(N) for all j 2 T nf i g . Now we have
(r(T;i)−"0
i)R(T)i (pi+"i)R(N)i piR(N)
and from Kj(G)  pj
^ ajR(T) j Kj(G)R(N)
%j pjR(N)
forallj 2 Tnfig. ThisimpliesthatpTR(N) 2 dom(T),whichisincontradictiontopR(N) 2 C(G).
We conclude that ki(G)  pi.
2
Example 3.4 Consider the game in example 3.2. Recall that K(G)=( 2 = 5 ;5 = 6 ;3 = 10)and k(G)=











p 2 (N);p 10 ;p 21 = 5 ;p 30 ;6 p 1+5 p 24 ;




It is easy to check that k(G)  p  K(G) for all pR(N) 2 C(G).
3
An immediate consequence of theorem 3.3 is that any game G with a nonempty core and with
R(N) 6=0is compromise admissible.
Lemma 3.5 Any game G 2G Nwith R(N) 6=0and C(G) 6= ; is compromise admissible.
Proof. Let G 2G Nb eag a m ew i t hR ( N)6 =0and C(G) 6= ;.L e tpR(N) 2 C(G). According to
theorem 3.3, ki(G)  pi  Ki(G) for all i 2 N. Hence, ki(G)  Ki(G) for all players i. Because









K i( G ) :
Further, by lemma 3.1, Ki(G) < 1 and ki(G) 2 IR for all i 2 N. Together with pi  Ki(G) this
results in Ki(G) 2 IR for all i 2 N. The game G is compromise admissible.
2
Another resultfor TU games is that if all the marginal vectors belongto the core of the game then
the minimal right of any player is equal to her individual payoff. This result is based on the fact that
for TU games where for some player i speciﬁc marginal vectors belong to the core, the minimal right
of this player is equal to her individual payoff. A similar result holds for cooperative games with
random payoffs.
Theorem 3.6 If G 2C Nand if for some player i it holds that M(G) 2 C(G) for all  2 (N)
with (1) = i then ki(G)= i( R ( f i g ) ;R(N)).
8Proof. Let G 2C Nand i 2 N be such that M(G) 2 C(G) for all  2 (N) with (1) = i.
Let  2 (N) be a permutation with (1) = i. By deﬁnition of a marginal vector M
(1) (1)
R(f(1)g).S i n c e (1) = i this reduces to M
i (G) i R(fig)and so,
M
i (G)= i( R ( f i g ) ;R(N))R(N) (3.1)
From G 2C Nand from assumption 2.3 we obtain R(N) 6=0since the game with R(S)=0for all
coalitions S is not an element of CN. Then by theorem 3.3, ki(G)  pi for all pR(N) in the core
C(G). In particular, M(G) 2 C(G) and this implies with (3.1) ki(G)  i(R(fig);R(N)).
On the other hand,
ki(G) = max
S:i2S
(S;i)  (fig;i)= i(R(fig);R(N)):
We conclude that ki(G)= i( R ( f i g ) ;R(N)).
2
Consequently, if for a game G 2C Nall marginal vectors belong to the core then ki(G)=
 i ( R ( f i g ) ;R(N))for all i 2 N.P l a y e riis indifferentbetween his individualpayoff R(fig)and the
minimal right ki(G)R(N).
4 Properties
In thissection wepresent several properties ofthecompromisevalue. We showthat fora special class
of games the compromise value is determined by the -value of a corresponding TU game. Further,
the compromise value coincides with the marginal value on the class of one- and two-persongames.
A solutionconcept Ψ on CN is called
(i) efﬁcient if for all G 2C N,Ψ(G)=pR(N) for some p 2 (N).
(ii) individualrationalif for all G 2C Nand for all i 2 N, Ψi(G)
%i R(fig).
(iii) anonymous if for all G 2C Nand for all  2 (N) we have Ψ(G)=  (Ψ(G)) where
G =( N;(R(S))S2S;A;(
i )i2N), R((U)) = R(U), S = f(S)jS 2S g ,A  =
f pR(S)jp 2 IR ;S2S  g , 
 ( i )= iand ((pR(N)))(i) = piR(N) for i 2 N and
p 2 IR N .
( iv) weakly proportionalif for all G 2C Nwith k(G)=0 ,Ψ(G) is proportionalto K(G)R(N).
(v) symmetricifforallG 2C N,andforalli;j 2 N suchthati = j andR(S[fig)=R ( S[fjg)
for all S  N nf i;jg,Ψi(G)=Ψ j( G ) .
( vi) strongly symmetric if for all G 2C Nand for all i;j 2 N with ki(G)=k j( G )and Ki(G)=
K j( G ) ,Ψ i( G )=Ψ j( G ) .
The compromise value satisﬁes these properties.
9Lemma 4.1 The compromise value c on CN is efﬁcient, individual rational, anonymous, weakly
proportional,symmetric and strongly symmetric.
Proof. We onlyshowthat c isindividualrationalandsymmetric on CN. The remainder of theproof
is left to the reader.
Let G 2C Nbe a compromise admissible game and let i 2 N. By deﬁnition of the compromise
value
i(c
i(G);R(N)) = ki(G)+γ(K i(G )−k i(G ))




%i i(R(fig);R(N))R(N) i R(fig):
The compromise value is individualrational.
Next, let i;j 2 N be such that i = j and R(S [f i g )=R ( S[f jg )for all S  N nf i;jg.
From R(N nf i g )=R ( Nnf jg )and i = j it follows that Ki(G)=K j( G ) . T h i si m p l i e st h a t
r ( S[fig;i)=r ( S[fjg;j)and (S [fig;i)= ( S[fjg;j)for all S  N nfi;jg. Consequently,
ki(G)=k j( G ) . It follows from the deﬁnitionof c that c
i(G)= c
j( G ) . The compromise value is
symmetric.
2
For games in GLI N \CN,w h e r eGLI N is the class of games in which all the players have linear
functions fi and identical preferences, the compromise value c and the -value are closely related.
Before we canpresentthisresultwe needtoknowwhatisa transferableutility(TU) game andwhatis
the -value of such a game. A TU game is a pair (N;v)where N is the player set and v is a function
that assigns to each coalition S a real number v(S) with the convention v(;)=0 . The utopia payoff
for player i 2 N is
Mi(v)=v ( N)−v ( Nnf i g ) (4.1)










The game (N;v)is called quasi-balanced if
m(v)  M(v) and
X
i2N




For quasi-balanced TU games (N;v)the -value is deﬁned by
(v)=m ( v )+(M(v)−m (v)) (4.4)
with 0    1 such that
P
i2N i(v)=v ( N) .
10Let G 2 GLI N \C N and deﬁne fS = fi






0 ;S = 2S ;
1 =fS(1);S 2S ;
and v(;)=0 .T h e -value of this game determines the compromise value of G.
Theorem 4.2 For all games G 2 GLI N \CN with R(N) 6=0and with the correspondingTU game
(N;v)satisfyingv(N nf i g )
P
j2 Nnfigv(fjg)for all i 2 N, c(G)=( v ) =v(N) R(N).
Proof. Let G 2 GLI N \CN b eag a m ew i t hR ( N)6 =0 .L e t( N;v)be the TU game corresponding
to G with
v(N nf i g )
X
j2 Nnfig
v(fjg)for all i 2 N: (4.5)










9 a 2 IR N nfig :
P
j2Nnfigaj +t =1 ;
aR(N) = 2 dom(N nf i g ); ajR(N)





















=1 − v ( N nfig)=v(N)
= Mi(v)=v(N);
wherethethirdandfourthequalityfollowfrom(4.5)and(4.1),respectively. BecauseGiscompromise
admissible, R(fig)  0 and R(N) 6=0we have
Ki(G)  ki(G)  (fig;i)= i( R ( f i g ) ;R(N)) 0: (4.6)










9 a 2 IR S nfig :
P
j2Snfigaj +t =1 ;













9 a 2 IR S nfig : t =1−
P
j 2 S nfigaj;
















Now the remainder of i in S equals



















A=v(N)=m i( v ) =v(N);











9 a 2 IR S nfig :
P
j2Snfigaj +t =1 ;




=s u p ; = −1:
The set over which the supremum is taken, is empty because, by (4.6), Kj(G)  0 which implies
Kj(G)R(N)
%j 0 for all j 2 N. Thus,







j 2 S nfig
Mj(v)  0  v(fig)  mi(v):
Hence, the remainder (S;i) will not determine the minimal right if R(S)=0 .
The game G is compromise admissible and therefore k(G)  K(G), which is equivalent to
m(v)  M(v). Second,
P
i2N ki(G)  1 
P
i2N Ki(G) is equal to
P
i2N mi(v)  v(N) 
P
i2N Mi(v). According to (4.3), the game (N;v)is quasi-balanced. Finally, the compromise value
is deﬁned by
c(G)=( k ( G )+γ(K(G )−k(G )))R(N)
where 0  γ  1 such that k(G)+γ( K( G )−k( G )) 2 (N).B u tt h e n
X
i 2 N
( m i ( v )+γ(M i(v)−m i(v))) = v(N);
by (4.4) (v)=m ( v )+γ(M(v)−m (v)) and c(G)=( v ) =v(N)R(N).
2
After this speciﬁc attention for games in GLI N \C N we will turn our attention to games in
CN. Deﬁne the subgame GT of G =( N;(R(S))S2S;A;(i)i2N) restricted to coalition T by GT =
(T;(R(S))S2ST;AT;(i)i2T) where ST = fS 2S j ST gand AT = fpR(S) 2A j S2S Tg .
Denote by  GN = [MN;M6=;GM the class of games in GN and all of their subgames. Similarly we
deﬁne  CN.
The remainderof thissectiondealswiththemarginal value. Therefore, assumption2.3isvalid. If
G is a one-person or a two-persongame then the compromise value and the marginal value coincide.
Theorem 4.3 c(G)= m( G )for all G 2  CN, jNj =2 .
12Proof. It is obvious that c(G)= m ( G )for one-person games G 2  CN. Next, let G 2  CN be a
two-persongame. Assume that N = f1;2g.T h e n
K 1( G ) = supft 2 IR j9a2 2 IR : a 2 + t =1 ;a 2R ( N)
%2R ( f 2 g ) g
=s u p f 1 − a 2 j a 2   2 ( R ( f 2 g ) ;R(N))g
=1 −  2 ( R ( f 2 g ) ;R(N)):
Similarly, K2(G)=1− 1 ( R ( f 1 g ) ;R(N)). Calculating the remainders results for player 1 in
coalitionf1g in
r(f1g;1) = 1;(f1g;1) = 1(R(f1g);R(N))
and for player 1 in coalition N
(N;1) = r(N;1) = supft 2 IR j9a2 2 IR : a 2 + t =1 ;a 2R ( N) 2K 2( G ) R ( N) g
=s u p f 1 − a 2 j a 2 >K 2( G ) g
=1 − K 2 ( G )= 1( R ( f 1 g ) ;R(N)):
The minimal right for player 1 is k1(G) = maxf(f1g;1);(N;1)g = 1(R(f1g);R(N)).I n a
similar way, k2(G)= 2( R ( f 2 g ) ;R(N)). Easy calculations show that
c(G)=1
2(1+ 1(R(f1g);R(N))− 2(R(f2g);R(N));
1 − 1(R(f1g);R(N))+ 2(R(f2g);R(N)))R(N);
The marginal vectors are
M(1;2)(G)=(  1( R ( f 1 g ) ;R(N));1− 1(R(f1g);R(N)))R(N)
and
M(2;1)(G)=( 1− 2( R ( f 2 g ) ;R(N)); 2(R(f2g);R(N)))R(N);
where (i;j) is shorthand for the permutation  with (1) = i and (2) = j. Their average, the
marginal value, is
m(G)=1
2(1 + 1(R(f1g);R(N))− 2(R(f2g);R(N));
1 − 1(R(f1g);R(N))+ 2(R(f2g);R(N)))R(N);
which is equal to the compromise value.
2
Timmer et al. (2000b) characterized the marginal value on  GN with jNj =2 .T h e y u s e t h e
followingproperty, which is based on the balanced contributionsproperty for cooperative TU games
by Myerson (1980). A solutionconcept Ψ on  GN is said to have




13Theorem 4.4 The compromise value c is the unique solution concept on  CN with jNj =2that is
efﬁcient and has balanced contributions.
Proof. This result follows from theorem 4.3 and from noting that theorem 4.8 in Timmer et al.
(2000b), which characterizes the marginal value on  GN with jNj =2 , also holds for m on  CN.
2
If we consider games with more than two players, then the compromise value and the marginal
value may be different, as is shown in the example below.
Example 4.5 Considerthe game in example 3.2. Let (i;j;k)denotethe permutation 2 (N) with
(1) = i, (2) = j,a n d(3) = k.T h e n
M (1;2;3)(G)=M (1;3;2)(G)=( 0 ;4 = 5 ;1 = 5)R(N);
M(2;1;3)(G)=( 1 = 2 ;1 = 5 ;3 = 10)R(N);
and so on. The average of the six marginal vectors is
m(G)=( 1 1 = 45;103=180;11=60)R(N);
which is unequal to the compromise value.
3
This example shows that we cannot use the characterization of the marginal value on GLI N (see
Timmer et al. (2000b)) to obtain a characterization of the compromise value on GLI N \C N.A
second possibilitywouldbe to search for a characterization of the compromise value with the help of
the -value of the related TU games (N;v). One of the assumptionson the payoffs is that R(S)  0
for all coalitions S. This implies v(S)  0, the game (N;v) is nonnegative. As far as we know
there does not exist a characterization of the -value on the class of nonnegative TU games or on any
subclass thereof. Hence, it remains an open question whether there exists a characterization of the
compromise value on GLI N \C Nor on some other subclass of CN.
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